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English common law reports are dense with ideas. Yet they remain mostly untapped by 
intellectual historians. This article reveals how intellectual history can engage with law and 
jurisprudence by following the notion that ‘infidels’ (specifically non-Christian individuals) 
deserved to receive exceptional treatment within England and across the globe. The starting 
point is Sir Edward Coke: he suggested that infidels could be conquered and constitutionally 
nullified, that they could be traded with only at the discretion of the monarch, and he 
confirmed their incapacity to enjoy full access to the common law. This article uncovers how 
each of these assertions influenced the development of the imperial constitution in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when it came to war, trade, and slavery. Identifying 
 each of the major moves away from Coke’s prejudices, this article argues that sometimes 
common lawyers responded to political change, but at other times anticipated it. 
 
 
 
 
 
The history of law must be a history of ideas. It must represent to us not merely what men 
have done and said, but what men have thought in bygone ages. […] [W]e must infer what 
people thought in the past from what they wrote. 
 
F. W. Maitland, “The Corporation Aggregate,” 1893.1  
 
 
The English common law relies upon the abilities of counsel and judges to interpret and 
evaluate precedents. This makes the law reports, which record the argumentation used to 
inform the judgments subsequently offered as precedents, critical to the process of 
administering justice. So they are today, as they were in the early modern period, when the 
industry professionalised. As reports became produced in large quantities and consumed by 
students, so too were they eradicated of variations in language, style, and substance. Whether 
adjectival or declaratory, all of the ideas found within the reports could then be seen to fall, as 
still they can today, into one of two categories: ratio decidendi, which is the reasoning behind 
a specific decision that binds later judges, and obiter dictum, which is an observation hashed 
                                                   
1 Frederic William Maitland, “The Corporation Aggregate: The History of a Legal Idea” (unpublished lecture, 
25th May, 1893). 
 out in the course of reaching a specific decision that is not considered to bind judges but may 
nevertheless be persuasive to them. This article will concern itself principally with dicta in 
order to consider the circumstances whereby they have come to be discredited or used to 
develop new precedents in the context of legal and political crises associated with trade, war, 
and slavery. Specifically it will look at those circumstances which compelled individuals 
working within the English common law to consider the idea that infidels were somehow 
different to Christians. Inspired by work at the crossroads of legal history and the intellectual 
history of the British Empire, this article presents a novel way to write the history of ideas.2  
This involves setting aside, but never forgetting, some of the best-known treatises and 
pamphlets in history, political philosophy, and political economy, in order to take jurisprudence 
seriously on its own terms.3 Approaching the law reports in their totality, and in isolation, 
encourages us to think like common lawyers did: for them, no material was more important 
than these reports. They represent a repository of ideas. Furthermore, and this is not trifling, 
here is an approach that allows for some consideration as to how far the trajectory of any single 
idea may be determined by the medium of its presentation. 
 
                                                   
2 Recent intellectual histories of empire which take law seriously include Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, 
Property and Empire, 1500-2000 (Cambridge, 2014); Richard Bourke, Empire and Revolution: The Political Life 
of Edmund Burke (Princeton, 2015); Duncan Bell, Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire 
(Princeton, 2015). The classic text is still David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire 
(Cambridge, 2000). Intellectual legal histories include Alan Cromartie, Sir Matthew Hale: Law, Religion, and 
Natural Philosophy (Cambridge, 1995); Alan Cromartie, The Constitutionalist Revolution: An Essay on the 
History of England (Cambridge, 2006); Michael Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence, 1760-
1850 (Oxford, 1991); Michael Lobban, A History of the Philosophy of Law in the Common Law World, 1600-
1900 (Dordrecht, 2007); Thomas Poole, Reason of State: Law, Prerogative and Empire (Cambridge, 2015). The 
pioneer of this tradition was Maitland, of course. 
3 This is not, of course, to suggest that the law reports represent the only place where law was discussed and acted 
out in the making of modern empires. Historians continue to maintain that ‘legal posturing’ was performed in a 
variety of different contexts by colonists, merchants, mid-level bureaucrats, governors, ministers, crown law 
officers, diplomats, and others who together shaped the legal mind of imperialism. Ronald Robinson and John 
Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (Basingstoke, 1982); 
Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires (Cambridge, 2009); Lauren 
Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 1800-1850 
(Cambridge, MA, 2016); Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern 
Foundations of the British Empire in India (Oxford, 2011).  
 This article begins with a consideration of perhaps the most important English common lawyer 
of his time, Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634). Coke was a man who expressed a number of the 
profound constitutional anxieties peculiarly associated with the Tudor-Stuart transition. For J. 
G. A. Pocock, it was at this very moment that there began to flourish a kind of ‘historical 
thought’ especially idealistic of timeless custom. It has been tempting for some legal historians 
to simplify and contort Pocock’s argument to suggest that, as the royal prerogative came to be 
used and misused by Stuart kings, so too did the “common law mind” look with greater 
selectivity and insularity into the English medieval past for evidence of institutional stability 
perseverant of that prerogative.4 Coke’s pronouncements in Calvin’s Case (1608) may be seen 
in this light, though it is more difficult to see all of Coke’s offerings upon the subject of infidels 
in a similar way. Besides running the risk of overlooking some subtleties of distinction between 
dicta and ratio in his jurisprudence, more recent scholars, like David Chan Smith and Ian 
Williams, have persuasively cautioned against seeing Coke’s approach to the powers of crown, 
parliament, and common law as inflexible. Instead we might rather see Coke as somewhat more 
of a reformist than he has been allowed by the strictest proponents of the theory that his ‘ancient 
constitutionalism’ was entirely oppositional to the royal prerogative.5  
 
Commerce and empire were crucial to the modernisation of the English common law. Scholars 
of Calvin’s Case and the imperial constitution have long appreciated this.6 What is less 
                                                   
4 J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study in English Historical Thought in the 
Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, 1987), esp. 30-69. See also Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient 
Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603-1642 (Basingstoke, 1992). 
5 David Chan Smith, Sir Edward Coke and the Reformation of the Laws: Religion, Politics and Jurisprudence, 
1578-1616 (Cambridge, 2014); Ian Williams, ‘Edward Coke’, in Denis Galligan, ed., Constitutions and the 
Classics: Patterns of Constitutional Thought from Fortescue to Bentham (Oxford, 2014); Cromartie, 
Constitutionalist Revolution, 179-233. For doubts about the ability to generalise about a “common law mind”, see 
J. W. Tubbs, The Common Law Mind: Medieval and Early Modern Conceptions (Baltimore, 2000).  
6 Daniel J. Hulsebosch, “The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British 
Jurisprudence,” Law and History Review, 21/3 (2003), 439-82; Gavin Loughton, “Calvin’s Case and the Origins 
of the Rule Governing ‘Conquest’ in English Law,” Australian Journal of Legal History, 8 (2004), 143-80; Poole, 
Reason of State, esp. 19-167. 
 common among historians, however, is an approach which takes a selection of Coke’s ideas 
on the same topic from different sources in order to follow these through the jurisprudence. 
Doing so, as this article does, reveals how lawyers and judges responded to developments at 
home and abroad. The jurist of most importance in this frame will be Lord Mansfield (1705-
93), whose reputation for intervention made him a favourite among private law reporters then, 
and historians now.7 As a revamping Chief Justice, Mansfield made a sport of discrediting 
Coke’s dicta, conscious of the need to make the common law more functional within a 
religiously tolerant commercial society such as Great Britain, he thought, should become.8 
Between Coke and Mansfield there lived John Holt (1642-1710), who is thoroughly interesting 
for managing to survive the officeholding upheavals of the 1680s to become a proponent of the 
unpopular idea of imposing limitations on government.9 This article will suggest moreover that 
a number of Holt’s observations about infidels within debates about conquest, commerce, and 
slavery became influential in the development of the imperial constitution in his lifetime too. 
As Holt and his colleagues were made to engage with Coke’s assertions about infidels, they 
were also confronted with an odd adaptation of these ideas, that is, one which suggested that 
the faithlessness of heathen slaves could provide for the possibility of recognising property in 
them.  
 
By no means, it is important to qualify, did Coke introduce the concept of faith into the English 
legal tradition. In the Middle Ages, tenants abided by the feudal expectation that an oath of 
fidelity (or “fealty”) was owed to their lords. Analogical to this was the expectation that clerks, 
merchants, and men of religion from Christendom beyond England were required to profess, 
                                                   
7 See especially James Oldham, The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the Eighteenth 
Century, 2 vols (Chapel Hill, 1992); James Oldham, English Common Law in the Age of Mansfield (Chapel Hill, 
2004). 
8 David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined (Cambridge, 1989), 88-121. 
9 Philip A. Hamburger, “Revolution and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt's Opinion in City of London v. Wood,” 
Columbia Law Review, 94/7 (1994), 2091-2153. 
 upon arrival into the realm, their fidelity to the king (ad fidem regis).10 Separate to this was the 
qualification of good faith (bona fide) for actions and obligations. This was a recognisable 
standard for individual interactions within the later medieval common law, just as it had been 
civilians, canonists, and theologians on the continent.11 A requirement of faithfulness was even 
set out in the very name of the action at common law which developed in the sixteenth century 
to account for contracts (assumpsit et fideliter promisit).12  
 
By contrast, what pertained within English law to faithlessness – specifically the inability to 
keep faith with other Christians – was obscure ever since the early emergence of this prejudice 
around the time of the Crusades. It may have been natural for William of Newburgh (1136-
1198) to associate the Jews of York with “perfidy,” for this had become something of an 
ethnographic trope across western Europe since at least Isidore of Seville (560-636), but how 
far such rhetoric can be said to have influenced English law is certainly a question.13 Lots of 
Jews bought and sold land and other things in England without much difficulty or harassment; 
or, at least, they did until 1290, when Edward I orchestrated a widespread eviction of Jews 
entirely on the basis of what he perceived to be the pernicious effects of their money-lending, 
rather than their faithlessness.14 With England purged of its Jewish population during the 
                                                   
10 For aliens, birthright, and status in England, see Keechang Kim, Aliens in Medieval Law: The Origins of Modern 
Citizenship (Cambridge, 2000). 
11 James Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers and Infidels: The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250-
1550 (Liverpool, 1979); Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and 
Church Law, 1150-1625 (Michigan, 2001); James Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of the Modern Contract 
Doctrine (Oxford, 1991), esp. 30-68; Martin Joseph Schermaier, “Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law,” in 
Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker, eds., Good Faith in European Contract Law (Cambridge, 2000), 
63-92; James Gordley, “Good Faith in the Medieval Ius Commune,” Zimmermann and Whittaker, Good Faith, 
93-117; Wim Decock, Theologians and Contract Law: The Moral Transformation of the Ius Commune (ca. 1500-
1650) (Leiden, 2013). 
12 David Ibbetson, Historical Introduction to Law of Obligations (Oxford, 1999), 126-52. 
13 Bat-Sheva Albert, “Isidore of Seville: His Attitude Towards Judaism and his Impact on Early Medieval Canon 
Law,” Jewish Quarterly Review, 80 3/4 (1990), 207-20; Wolfram Drews, The Unknown Neighbour: The Jew in 
the Thought of Isidore of Seville (Leiden, 2006).  
14 Paul Hyams, “The Jews in Medieval England,” in Alfred Haverkamp and Hanna Vollrath, eds., England and 
Germany in the High Middle Ages (Oxford, 1996); Paul Hyams, “Faith, Fealty and Jewish ‘Infidels’ in Twelfth-
Century England,” in Sarah Rees Jones and Sethina Watson, eds., Christians and Jews in Angevin England (York, 
 fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, that left few subjects of the realm around to 
identify openly as non-Christians – and none, it is surely more important for the purposes of 
this article, to record their pleas before the courts of common law. Not until 1520 was the 
inability of a “pagan” to have an action at common law first observed by Justice Richard Broke 
on a case of trespass in the Court of Common Pleas: to Broke’s mind, the circumstances of that 
case – concerning the disputed ownership between two Christian Englishmen of a bloodhound 
– required a distinction between damages and injury, for which purpose it was necessary to run 
through the legal disabilities of outlaws, traitors, and pagans (all of whom featured alongside 
women and villeins).15 Pagans belonged to this motley crew of common-law rejects owing to 
their inability to keep faith and swear oaths, a disability that was subsequently expanded, 
through legislation, to make them out to be the enemies of the crown.16  
 
In other words, whereas good faith could attach itself to customs governing the intention and 
performance of individuals within contractual relations, and fidelity could attach itself to the 
symbolism and ceremony of loyalty and ligeance, infidelity was a vague condition of legal 
disability up to the end of the Tudor period. Coke’s importance owes to his association of 
infidels with three particular characteristics in the early seventeenth century: infidels could be 
conquered and taken over in toto; infidels could be traded with only at the discretion of the 
monarch; infidels could never give evidence at common law. While these novelties were 
conceived in England from dicta and commentaries offered to explain conditions in England, 
                                                   
2013), 125-47; P. Elman, “The Economic Causes of the Expulsion of the Jews in 1290,” Economic History 
Review, 7/2 (1937), 145-54.  
15 Y[ear] B[ooks] Trin. 12 Hen. VIII, fo. 4, pl. 3 (1520.003ss): “Et home foit faire damage a moy, & ne faire 
injury (damnum absque injuria); Come si l' Seignior bate son villein, ou l' baron sa feme, ou on bate un home 
utlage ou traitor, ou pagan, ils n' auront accion, pur ceo qu ilz ne sont pas able de suir action.” For the observation 
that the reference here to pagans is “esoteric,” see J. H. Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Volume 
VI: 1483-1558 (Oxford, 2003), 598n13.  
16 The earliest statutory expression of “infidels,” found in a few Tudor statutes, recurs with similarly miscellaneous 
association to other foes of the crown: each of the Treason Acts of 1534, 1551, and 1571 takes aim at “any person” 
that might be “an Heretick, Schismatick, Tyrant, Infidel or Usurper of the Crown.” See Treasons Act (1534), 26 
Hen. VIII, c. 13; Treason Act (1551), 5-6 Edw. VI, c. 11; Treason Act (1571), 13 Eliz. I, c. 1.  
 their effects would be most remarkable beyond the British Isles. Lawyers at home and abroad 
had no choice but to return to Coke time and again to make sense of the developing imperial 
constitution from the earliest settlement at Jamestown to the aftermath of the Seven Years’ 
War. As a result, a variety of different colonial interests were drawn into contemplations of 
their activities in relation to Coke’s feelings about infidels. At different times, chartered 
corporations, private traders, slavers, planters, and settlers were affected in their own different 
ways by the idea of infidels.  
 
In his assessment of Protestant wariness towards infidels in early modern empires, Richard 
Tuck argues that the idea of maintaining distance from non-Christians because they were non-
Christians had finally become absurd by the early eighteenth century. Within the English 
common law tradition, Tuck sees East India Company vs Thomas Sandys (1683-5) as the 
turning point, despite judgment in that case actually supporting Coke’s argument for the 
prerogative to impose restrictions upon trading with infidels.17 This article will suggest, 
instead, that it was not until the other side of the Glorious Revolution that Coke’s views upon 
infidel disability were abandoned. Additionally, it is acknowledged here that prohibiting 
communication and trade with infidels was only one of the hindrances faced by non-Christians 
in English law: when it came to the circumstances of conquered infidels, Coke’s dicta were not 
dismissed definitively until the delivery of Lord Mansfield’s adjudication in Campbell v Hall 
(1774), it is shown below. When it came to the assertion that infidelity provided for a qualified 
property in slaves, again it was Lord Mansfield, in Somerset v Stewart (1772), who did the 
same.  
 
                                                   
17 Richard Tuck, “Alliances with Infidels in the European Imperial Expansion,” in Sankar Muthu, ed., Empire and 
Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, 2012), 61-83. 
 In conclusion, this article will reveal how the question of non-Christian deposition provides a 
fine way to understand, per Maitland, “what people thought in the past” not only about infidels 
but the entire common law enterprise. Here, as with every one of the major turning points 
presented in this article, we see one of two tendencies shown by common lawyers on the topic 
of empire: sometimes they responded to political change, and at other times they anticipated it. 
 
“ALL INFIDELS ARE IN LAW PERPETUI INIMICI”  
 
The earliest and constitutionally most significant instance whereby Sir Edward Coke was 
drawn into contemplation of infidels occurred with the changing of the dynasty. When James 
VI of Scotland accepted the English crown to become James I late in 1603, his head quickly 
swelled into it. Embracing a superciliousness and style as the self-ordained “King of Great 
Britain,” James grew fond of the prerogative and frightened the House of Commons. In a flurry 
of no less than fifty royal proclamations in just the first two years of his reign, one issued in 
October 1604 advertised the king’s desire to reign above a “Union” of the realms, which also 
proclaimed that “divers of the ancient Lawes of this Realme are Ipso facto expired,” just 
because of his succession.18 This reeked of conquest, but common lawyers generally took little 
fright from the prerogative instrument of proclamation, so they were happy to remain 
unconvinced (for the time being) by this suggestion that their whole enterprise was somehow 
now in jeopardy.19 Parliamentarians, on the other hand, would require further convincing that 
they were not, in fact, a conquered institution, with James himself doing little to diminish these 
fears by his desperate invocation of muddled imagery to explain a constitutional relationship 
                                                   
18 Royal Proclamation (20 October 1604), in James F. Larkin and Paul L. Hughes, eds., Stuart Royal 
Proclamations (hereafter: SRP) (Oxford, 1973), 1: 94-8. 
19 Baker, Oxford History of the Laws of England, 64-6. For the expansion and contraction of royal proclamations 
during the Tudor period, see R. W. Heinze, The Proclamations of the Tudor Kings (Cambridge, 1976); Frederic 
A. Youngs Jr., The Proclamations of the Tudor Queens (Cambridge, 1976). 
 between Scotland and England: “London must be the Seat of your King, and Scotland joined 
to this kingdom by a golden Conquest, but cemented with Love, as I said before; which, within, 
will make you strong against all civil and intestine Rebellion.”20  
  
So unprecedented were these developments – and those metaphors – that the laws of England 
had no advice to offer on the rights available to, and jurisdiction over, Scottish postnati (that 
is, those subjects of the Scottish crown born after the union of the two realms in 1603). Here 
was the issue to charge up the common lawyers. For centuries, the fullest access to English law 
required a subject to profess singular allegiance within England. As separate realms were now 
united under the same crown, it remained to be seen, in the common law, whether or not this 
rule would be upheld or modified. A defect like this might have been addressed through statute 
were the issue less directly to concern the new king and his powers. After a special commission 
installed to investigate the matter only deferred the matter back to parliament, however, the 
issue was watchfully set aside for the scrutiny of the courts. A collusive action led in 1607 to 
the bringing of two suits in the name of a Scottish infant and legatee, Robert Colville, who had 
been born fresh upon the accession of James to England. Occasioning the input of England’s 
legal professionals in the King’s Bench and the Exchequer Chamber, there was clearly more at 
stake in these proceedings than whether or not the three-year-old Colville was capable of 
inheriting land in England. What gave Calvin’s Case (1608), as it became known, its great  
“weight and importance,” was the chance it provided to resolve a series of controversies about 
mixed allegiances, the process of naturalisation, the substance of birthright, and the prerogative 
itself.21  
 
                                                   
20 JHC 1: 363. 
21 Polly Price, “Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608),” Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities, 9/1 (1997), 73-145; Brian Levack, The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland, and the 
Union, 1603-1707 (Oxford, 1987), Ch. 3. 
 Conquest emerges as one of the key issues in Calvin’s Case. Though nobody in support of the 
postnatus considered James’s accession of 1603 to be a conquest, still it had to be shown 
through persuasive argumentation that it was not a conquest. The problem here was that the 
common law contained no clues about what a conquest actually consisted of. Nor did the 
common law contain much apart from a few incidents of personal prescriptive pleas to indicate 
how conquest might disturb existing usages and customs.22 What Calvin’s Case presented, 
during the constitutionally anxious beginnings of the Stuart period, was the opportunity to 
develop the historical argument that conquest did very little which the common law recognised. 
 
Counsel for both sides talked at great lengths about the extent to which the conquest of Ireland 
“by descent,” as such it could be interpreted, allowed for the laws of England to be imposed 
there, what privileges the Irish enjoyed as English subjects as a result, and how (though this 
was largely Coke’s mastery) it was parliament which bonded its relationship to the crown.23 
The Norman conquest was even discussed, if as an abstraction, for Calvin’s Case was less 
about the reception of foreign conquerors in English law so much as it was about the reception 
of foreign-born subjects.24 For Coke, the conquest of 1066 had no relevance except insofar as 
                                                   
22 Appeals both to the time and, more generally, to the person of William the “Conquestor,” were levelled by 
defendants, plaintiffs, and judges during the long fourteenth century largely as a means of garnishing some liberty, 
franchise, or usage with ancientness, with uneven results. YB Mich. 22 Edw. 1, RS 339-43, pl. 20 (1294.020rs); 
YB Hil. 3 Edw. 2, 20 SS 44-45, pl. 29 (1310.029ss); YB Pasch. 5 Edw. 2, 33 SS 14-9, pl. 19 (1312.080ss); YB 
Trin. 7 Edw. 2, 247-8, pl. 36 (1314.132); YB Hil. 14 Edw. 2, 422-3, pl. 30 (1321.030); YB Hil. 4 Edw. 3, 98 SS 
707-8, pl. 375 (1330.824ss); YB Hil. 19 Edw. 3, RS 555-9, pl. 50 (1345.050rs); YB Mich. 21 Edw. 3, 60a-b, pl. 7 
(1347.207); YB Hil. 29 Edw. 3, 17b, pl. 52 (1355.052); YB Trin. 49 Edw. 3, 22b-23a, pl. 8 (1375.033). The 
conquest of 1066 was sufficiently beyond the “temps de memory” thereafter to keep it from the attention of the 
common law.  
23 For Francis Bacon’s stance, see C[obbett's Complete Collection of] S[tate] T[rials] (London, 1809-26), 2: 591-
2, seeing also Bacon’s Discourse on the Union of Kingdoms, in James Spedding, ed., The Letters and Life of 
Francis Bacon (London, 1863), 3: 93, which makes the distinction between violent unions and natural unions, 
whereby, in the former, “the conquering state doth extinguish, extirpate, and expulse any part of the state 
conquered, which it findeth so contrary as it cannot alter and convert it.” Ellesmere, by no means a Chancellor 
inclined to disrobe the king of his prerogative, refuted the idea of an absolutist conqueror of Ireland. See ST 2: 
681, which aligned him with the position of Yelverton, a judge from the King’s Bench, in distinguishing between 
“an undoubted title made by lawe” and “a doubtfull title wonne by the sword.” For Coke’s argument that England 
and Ireland were separate but unequal dominions, though allowing the Irish as “natural born subjects [to be] 
capable of and inheritable to laws in England,” see CST 2: 647-8; 7 Co[ke] Rep[orts] 17b, 22b, 23a; Steve 
Sheppard, ed., The Selected Writings of Sir Edward Coke (Indianapolis, 2003), 1: 207-8, 218-20. 
24 See, however, CST 2: 586-7, 601, 681. 
 it generated a mixture of claims by descent in Jersey and Guernsey, which formed only small 
parts of a great historical survey in which little could be said for the conquest of 1066.25 It was 
in this survey that Coke developed his theory of allegiance, which required some categorisation 
of the types of aliens that may be recognised or shunned by English law.26 This drew him into 
an unconnected exploration of the ‘diversity between a conquest of a kingdom of a Christian 
king, and the conquest of a kingdom of an infidel’:  
 
for if a king come to a Christian kingdom by conquest, seeing that he hath vitae et necis 
potestatem [i.e., a power over life and death], he may at his pleasure alter and change 
the laws of that kingdom, but until he doth make an alteration of those laws, the ancient 
laws of that kingdom remain. But if a Christian king should conquer a kingdom of an 
infidel, and bring them under his subjection, there ipso facto the laws of the infidel are 
abrogated; for that they be not only against Christianity, but against the law of God and 
of nature, contained in the Decalogue: and in that case, until certain laws be established 
amongst them, the king by himself, and such judges as he shall appoint, shall judge 
them and their causes according to natural equity, in such sort as kings in ancient time 
did with their kingdoms, before any certain municipal laws were given, as before hath 
been said.27  
 
Insofar, then, as Coke was prepared to contemplate the legal personalities of conqueror and 
conquered, it was religion, more so than political or corporate affiliation, which mattered. 
                                                   
25 CST 2: 645; 7 Co. Rep. 21a; Sheppard, Writings, 1: 214-5. 
26 See Kim, Aliens in Medieval Law, 176-99. 
27 CST 2: 638; 7 Co. Rep. 17b; Sheppard, Writings, 1: 207. The power of life and death derived from Roman 
political thought; it had been adopted by Bodin in his familial analogies of book one of the Six Livres de la 
Republique (1576). For similarities between Bodin and Coke, see Price, “Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship,” 
73-145. 
 According to Coke’s improvisation, victorious wars waged upon non-Christian polities vested 
more to the conqueror than those waged upon Christian polities. And that was not all:  
 
All infidels are in law perpetui inimici, perpetual enemies (for the law presumes not 
that they will be converted, that being remota potentia, a remote possibility) for 
between them, as with the devils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there is 
perpetual hostility, and can be no peace; for as the Apostle saith, 2 Cor. 15. Quae autem 
conventio Christi ad Belial, aut quae pars fideli cum infideli, and the Law saith, Judaeo 
Christianum nullum serviat mancipium, nefas enim est quem Christus redemit 
blasphemum Christi in servitutis vinculis detinere.28  
 
The first of these expressions is Italian, not Latin, and appears to derive from the Discorsi of 
Machiavelli, at least one copy of which Coke appears to have owned. Whereas Machiavelli 
referred, however, to Equians and Volscians as enemies of the Romans, Coke referred here to 
infidels as enemies of Christians. In support, Coke gives 2 Corinthians.29 But he gives nothing 
away in respect of the passage following “the Law saith,” and establishing that no Christian, 
by virtue of his redemption, should ever be made the slave of a Jew or anyone else who 
blasphemes against Christ.30  
 
                                                   
28 CST 2: 638; 7 Co. Rep. 17b; Sheppard, Writings, 1: 206-7. 
29 “Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for what fellowship hath righteousness with 
unrighteousness? and what communion hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial? or 
what part hath he that believeth with an infidel?,” 2 Cor. 6: 14-5 (KJV). Belial ( ְבִליַַּעל ) often connotes with the 
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generally follow after Gavin Loughton, “Coke’s Theory of Infidels as ‘Perpetui Inimici’: His Sources” 
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Settlement: The Origins of the Colonies Rule” (unpublished M.Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 2002).  
 To the extent that Coke was knowingly placing an Easter egg here for subsequent jurists of the 
British empire to fall upon in their considerations of an expanding Christian empire is, of 
course, a question. Alternatively, and more traditionally, these remarks might instead be 
understood as part of Coke’s larger agenda of venerating the resilience of laws within England: 
infidels are invoked only to reveal what sort of conquest 1066 was not. Elsewhere, best of all 
in the prefaces of his Reports, Coke is at more strenuous pains to show “that the Common Law 
of England had beene time out of minde of man before the Conquest, and was not altered or 
changed by the Conquerour.”31 In this, Coke was unshakeable for the rest of his life.  
 
Coke never wrote again about the conquest of infidels, though he had other observations to 
make about their disabilities at common law. When, around the same time, a case came before 
the Court of Common Pleas concerning the validity of trading privileges granted to Sir Edward 
Michelborne, Coke remembered infidels again. The report, however, is brief. In 1604, 
Michelborne received letters patent for himself from James I/VI which permitted him to trade 
into Asia. Subsequently Michelborne headed into the Indies, where he plundered some booty 
from the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, before returning home to England. Were his 
letters patent still good for another voyage after this? Or were they in conflict with Elizabeth’s 
1601 charter of incorporation for the East India Company, which included – as was her style – 
provisions of trading exclusivity within them?32 These were likely the questions which 
prompted Coke to return the politics of religion to the common law on the question of traders 
beyond the realm. In his assessment of the legality of Michelborne’s exploits, Chief Justice 
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 Coke laid down “that no subject of the King [can] trade within any realm of infidels, without 
license of the King.” His only cited authority for this remark is an obscure trading license, 
“made in the time of Ed. 3,” apparently issued by the king to keep subjects from lapsing from 
their “faith and religion.”33 It is not clear what if any pressure the East India Company had 
placed on the case, nor can we be sure what result came of it. Michelborne never returned to 
Asia; his name is listed among the named members of the Virginia Company by its charter of 
1609, but he was dead by the time the charter was issued by the great seal.34 Importantly, 
Michelborne had revealed another side to Coke: in the report, Coke identifies among the 
personal powers of the monarch a right to impede traders from leaving the realm to 
communicate with non-Christians. In this was an assertion that ran contrary to those of a 
burgeoning free trade lobby that parliament through legislation should wrest control of 
commerce from the crown.35 
 
The third of Coke’s contributions in shaping the defective personality of infidels at common 
law differs in form and context to Calvin’s Case and Michelborne, where his arguments take 
the form of dicta and reason in judgments. Rather, it would be in his scholarly commentaries 
and elaboration on the work of the English jurist Littleton, The Institutes of the Lawes of 
England (1628-44), that Coke professed his belief that infidels, along with those of “non-sane 
memory,” could never appear as witnesses in England, and only Christians could take oaths.36 
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9. 
 A number of factors, among them Coke’s career at this time moving out of the courts and into 
parliament, and the opportunities he took while making this transition to reiterate his own views 
on contentious aspects of the law, combine to instil some caution into modern scholars in 
approach of this compendium.37 Seventeenth-century common lawyers in training and in 
practice shared no such caution. They consulted the Institutes when it suited their particular 
purposes, and subsequently the work is one of the most-cited texts in the reports before 
Blackstone. Though Coke’s offerings in the Institutes were not always strictly derived from 
the precedents of case law (and that is to be charitable), still many of these ideas influenced the 
common law on infidels well after Coke’s death in 1634.  
 
“THAT STRANGE EXTRAJUDICIAL OPINION […] AS TO THIS PURPOSE IS 
WHOLLY GROUNDLESS” 
 
The earliest pieces of news and fool’s gold from Jamestown had already reached England by 
the time that Coke’s contributions to Calvin’s Case were quickly rushed into print (in English 
instead of the Law French) to appear in the Seventh Part of his reports at the end of 1608.38 
There may have already been some talk about the conquest of infidels in London, then, before 
Robert Gray, early in 1609, delivered a sermon contemplating the prospect of conquering 
Virginia and its annexure thereby to England. But unlike Coke, whose mostly needless remarks 
about the conquest of infidels had been offered hypothetically to imply a restriction upon the 
arbitrary will of conquerors within Christian realms, Gray gestured more towards the motions 
to be made before a conquest than any of those consequences that may follow afterwards. 
Citing unnamed authorities, Gray suggested that “all Polititians doe with one consent holde 
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 and maintaine, that a Christian King may lawfullie make warre uppon barbarous and savage 
people, and such as live under no lawfull or warrantable government, and may make a conquest 
of them.”39 Scarce can be made of this kind of grandstanding, which is best, in this window, to 
be seen as part of a wider attempt to drum up support for the flailing enterprise in Virginia by 
preachers and laymen looking favourably upon the Virginia Company of London.40 After 1622, 
however, Gray’s prophesy played out, as the London ‘court’ of the Virginia Company and the 
Jamestown government looked actively “to destroy” their “barbarous and p[er]fidious 
enemys,” the Powhatans, right up to 1624.41 The faithlessness of the Powhatans was also 
invoked in this window to undermine Powhatan donations of land. The company resolved to 
avoid all identification of any legal personality in an infidel sufficient to allow either his public 
or private alienation of land.42 Perceived defects in the capacity of infidels well favoured the 
Virginia Company, in other words, before Charles I replaced the company administration with 
a system of direct rule and inaugurated the first New World crown colony in the history of the 
British Empire in 1625.43 
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Wesley F. Craven, The Virginia Company of London, 1606-1624 (Charlottesville, 1957), 54-8; Discourse of the 
  
The Virginia Company may have waged war upon the Powhatans in 1622-4, just like the 
Massachusetts Bay corporation would upon the Pequots in 1637, but it was not until the reign 
of Charles II that corporations chartered for foreign trade began to receive explicit authorisation 
to declare martial law and wage wars on infidels abroad. The East India Company would 
become the most enthusiastic recipient of the powers of war and peace upon infidels. Though 
founded by the patents of Elizabeth I in 1600, and sustained thereafter by the patents of James 
I and an obscure guarantee of Protector Cromwell, only in 1661 did the corporation receive a 
charter permitting it “to continue or make Peace or War with any Prince or People, that are not 
Christians, in any Places of their Trade.”44 In other words, all infidels found between the Cape 
of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan could be (and would be) attacked without need for 
prior endorsement of the home government.45 This was no one-off grant, either: the Hudson’s 
Bay Company was granted similar powers of war and peace for non-Christians in Rupert’s 
Land in 1670; in 1672, the Royal African Company was likewise equipped with a martial 
capability for all of its dealings with non-Christians along the west coast of Africa.46 If it was 
not bizarre enough, within the English legal tradition, that a Christian prince might justly 
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 impose an entirely new constitutional predicament upon non-Christian communities by virtue 
of their faithlessness alone (per Calvin’s Case), now chartered corporations were vested, by 
the royal prerogative, with powers of subordinating non-Christian communities as just such a 
Christian prince might.  
 
In this period, for the first time since Coke, infidels made a comeback in the common law 
reports. These reports are highly abbreviated, but appear to reveal some ambivalence with 
regard to his dicta: whereas the conquest of infidels was easily invoked as a point of contrast 
to discussions about legal receptivity in Ireland and Wales, there is evidence of a slight move 
away from the idea that infidels were automatically the “perpetual enemies” of the king (oddly, 
however, in a case concerning the recovery of property seized from a Christian Dutch 
merchant).47  
 
Infidels were soon to figure in separate discussions about the empire as a result of the great 
doubts which abounded in the middle decades of the seventeenth century over the status of 
overseas colonies and plantations.48 It had become unclear, in the Stuart period, whether or not 
colonies like Virginia or Jamaica should be considered conquests, and consequentially, how 
far and why the king’s prerogative could alone create laws for them. Until Blankard v Galdy 
(1693), no reported case at common law contained any clues as to which overseas possessions 
could be considered conquered and what their conquests entailed for government. This case 
concerned an attempt to recover debts in Jamaica. When counsel in defence made recourse to 
a statute from Elizabeth’s time to disqualify the action, counsel for Blankard advanced the 
argument that Jamaica “was an island beyond the seas, which was conquered from the Indians 
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 and Spaniards in Q. Elizabeth’s time, and the inhabitants are governed by their own laws, and 
not by the laws of England.”49 Chief Justice John Holt found for the plaintiff, but he did more 
than that. Modifying Calvin’s Case, his judgment removed all actions of this kind, concerning 
Jamaica, from the consideration of the Court of King’s Bench. As the more detailed report of 
the judgement makes clear, Holt felt Jamaica was “a conquered country.” Whether that 
conquest was of Christian Spaniards or infidel natives was unclear; regardless, the court 
qualified in conclusion that 
 
in the case of an infidel country, their laws by conquest do not entirely cease, but only 
such as are against the law of God; and that in such cases where the laws are rejected 
or silent, the conquered country shall be governed according to the rule of natural 
equity.50  
 
Whatever the needlessness of any recourse to the “law of God,” this was a pragmatic 
distinction: sometimes it was unpractical, uneconomical, and administratively impossible for 
formerly non-Christian plantations to receive automatically all the laws of England upon 
conquest, as was just becoming clear during the reign of Charles II.  
 
What is more remarkable for our purposes is Holt’s decision to apply this idea to Virginia a 
few years later in Smith v Brown and Cooper (1702). This was a case before the Court of King’s 
Bench which saw two individuals attempting to escape from obligations to pay for a slave they 
agreed to buy on the grounds that the conveyance of human chattel was contrary to the laws of 
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 England. Chief Justice Holt would not be moved, “for the laws of England do not extend to 
Virginia, being a conquered country their law is what the King pleases; and we cannot take 
notice of it but as set forth,” for “negroes are saleable” there. Quite how Virginia was so 
conquered – if at all by a corporation – was not clear. What is surely more important is how, 
with the merest of twists to Coke’s jurisprudence, the conquest of infidels was here perceived 
to provide for the jurisdictional separation of slavery abroad from slavery at home.51 
 
After Holt’s opinions appeared in the Salkeld reports (published between 1717 and 1722), it 
became increasingly possible to contemplate separately the performance of conquest and the 
process of settling. This led to some muddling of the freshly made theoretical distinction 
between the two types of colony, and how, if at all, the presence of infidels could help to define 
either condition. In practice, the colonial peripheries defied neat classification. In Maryland 
between 1722 and 1726, Blankard v Glady was consulted by members of the lower house to 
determine “how far they are to be regarded by such Conquerors or Occupants,” in respect to 
the reception of English laws after the usurpation of the “Native Indian Infidels.”52 In 
Newfoundland during the 1730s, jurisdictional conflicts between magistrates and ‘fishing 
admirals’ raised similar dilemmas over the applicability of certain statutes too, leading the 
solicitor general, Francis Fane, to advise “that all the statute laws made here previous to H.M. 
subjects settling in Newfoundland are in force there: it being a settlement in an infidel country: 
[…] laws passed here subsequent to the settlement […] will not extend to this country unless 
it is particularly mentioned.”53 References either side of this opinion to the Privy Council and 
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 Chancery from Barbados confirmed a similar stance towards the receptivity of English statutes, 
along with further confirmation of Holt’s convention that only such “laws and customs” as “are 
contrary to our religion” are voidable “by the conquering prince”. Again, however, there 
appeared no concrete examples or guidelines to allow for some clarification of the distinction 
between settled/‘uninhabited’ and conquered colonies, let alone any judgement about the types 
of law and custom that might be considered repugnant to the Church of England.54 
 
Although India was not yet considered to be compatible in relation to distinctions of this kind, 
political developments in Bengal would contribute to the abandonment of faith as a criterion 
for determinations of legal obligations in overseas territories. Following the death of 
Aurungzeb in 1707, the unified Mughal empire to which the East India Company had grown 
accustomed began to spall off in a number of jostling successor states. In this context, the scope 
for martial conduct expanded, which was endorsed in the martial provisions of new charters 
granted to the company in 1726 and 1753.55 The latter of these was issued just in time for the 
official outbreak of war with France, an event responsible for removing any practical division 
between Christian and non-Christian combatants in India. Even though European trading 
companies had been squaring off with each other intermittently during the 1740s – often on 
behalf of their allied Indian princes – the formal outbreak of the Seven Years’ War in 1756 
made the Crown a direct interest in the company’s skirmishes with the French state, the French 
East India Company, and native Indians. A theatre of war of such complexity was unforeseen 
by basic wartime legislation on the matter of French prizes, which made no provision for royal 
armies, corporate armies, and native armies facing off on many fronts, sometimes in uneven 
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 combinations, and sometimes on their own.56 In consequence, as the attorney general and 
solicitor general were confounded to propose a way to distinguish between company “treaties” 
and crown “conquests,” it was deemed no longer practical or necessary to distinguish between 
enemies on account of their faith. Their new preference was instead to develop a distinction 
between “European” and “Indian.”57 
 
Besides those in the sub-continent, the Seven Years War (1756-63) had a number of overseas 
theatres in the Atlantic. Victorious in many of these, Great Britain collected a number of new 
cessions, which finally prompted parliament and the courts to contemplate anew the juristic 
meaning of conquest and its place in the imperial constitution. Early on, Quebec formed the 
centrepiece of discussions on this head: being Christian though Catholic, its receptivity to 
English laws (and English Protestantism) remained uncertain for over a decade.58 The island 
of Grenada fell into the same boat, of course, but what brought it, and not Quebec, to the 
attention of the courts was not the applicability of statutory law there, but rather the issue of 
prerogative taxation. When the planter, Alexander Campbell, called the king’s jurisdictional 
                                                   
56 29 Geo. II, c. 34.  
57 Referred Queries (16 November 1757), British Library, Hardwicke Papers, MS 35917, 22-5; Copy of the 
Attorney and Solicitor Generals Report, on the Petition of the East India Company (24 December 1757), in Sheila 
Lambert, ed., House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century (Wilmington, DE, 1975), 26: 6-7; 
British Library, India Office Records, A/2/7, 99-108. When finally the company’s warlike conduct against Indians 
was contemplated within English courts of law, in Nabob of the Carnatic v East India Company (1791-3), faith 
was an inconsequential to the otherwise lengthy trial. Those parts of Calvin’s Case (1608) pertaining to the 
conquest of infidels were no longer deemed relevant in the 1790s. By this time, besides, an informal corporate 
empire had been superseded, with Pitt’s India Act (1784), by a more formal system of governing Indian territories 
with crown oversight. See Nabob of Arcot v East India Company (1791) 29 ER 544; Nabob of the Carnatic v East 
India Company (1791) 30 ER 391; The Nabob of Arcot v The East India Company (1793) 29 ER 841 [“There is 
one objection made to the person of the plaintiff in this case, that he is not a Christian: but that objection has been 
over-ruled these many years”]; Nabob of the Carnatic v East India Company (1793) 30 ER 521. Stat. 24 Geo. III, 
s. 2, c. 25. 
58 “Is it possible,” asked Mansfield with exasperation of Prime Minister Grenville in 1764, “that we have abolished 
their laws, and customs, and forms of judicature all at once?—a thing never to be attempted or wished. The history 
of the world do[es]n’t furnish an instance of so rash and unjust an act by any conqueror whatsoever: much less by 
the Crown of England, which has always left to the conquered their own laws and usages, with a change only so 
far as the sovereignty was concerned […] The fundamental maxims are that a country conquered keeps her own 
laws, ’till the conqueror expressly gives new.” Mansfield to Grenville (24 December 1764), The Grenville Papers, 
ed. William James Smith (London: John Murray 1852), 2: 476-8. The classic treatment remains Philip Lawson, 
The Imperial Challenge: Quebec and Britain in the Age of the American Revolution (Montreal and Kingston, 
1989). 
 bluff by bringing an action to recover the amount paid to a crown customs officer, the matter 
made its way to the King’s Bench. With that, the scene was set for a special verdict to expose 
what conquest actually entailed for king and parliament in the British Empire.  
 
Chief Justice presiding was Lord Mansfield. True to form, he appeared uneasy about references 
to Calvin’s Case during the arguments of Campbell v Hall (1774).59 When Archibald 
MacDonald invoked Coke in his appearance for Campbell, Mansfield interjected with an 
observation that those “opinions are very loose.” Later, when Francis Hargrave, appearing for 
the customs collector Hall, insisted that the ability to alter conquered constitutions belonged 
entirely to the royal prerogative, and proceeded to use Calvin’s Case to distinguish between 
countries acquired by “conquest” and “descent,” what little credibility remained for Coke’s 
lines on infidels is clear from the interchange that followed: 
 
Hargrave: Coke mixes it with another distinction between Infidel and Christian 
countries which is now justly exploded. But this ought not to prejudice the other part 
of the doctrine, which is not liable to the same objection— 
 
Mansfield: Don’t quote the distinction for the honour of lord Coke.  
 
Hargrave: My lord, I cite the case, not on account of the distinction between Infidel 
and Christians, but for the doctrine assented to by the judges in respect to the right of 
the king over all conquered countries. Though the difference derived from the religion 
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 of the country may be absurd and unreasonable, still there may be other parts of the 
case not liable to objection. Lord Coke, describing the king’s power over a conquered 
country, says, “He may at pleasure alter and change the laws of the kingdom: but till he 
does make an alteration the ancient laws remain.” So that according to the opinion in 
this case, the king has the complete power of changing the laws of the conquered 
people, as he thinks proper and convenient.60  
 
Later in the trial, when John Glynn, for Campbell, mentioned Coke’s dictum about conquered 
infidels only to confirm that he should hope ‘for the honour of lord Coke [that] it ought not to 
be spoken of [again]’, he was nearly correct.61 It would be spoken of again, but once more, as 
Mansfield drove the final nail into the coffin with his ruling. Still deferential, Mansfield moved 
the modern jurisprudence of his court from Coke’s medieval prejudices:  
 
The laws of a conquered country continue until they are altered by the conqueror […] 
[T]he absurd exception as to pagans, in Calvin’s case, shews the universality of the 
maxim. The exception could not exist before the Christian era, and in all probability 
arose from the mad enthusiasm of the crusades.  
 
Preserving Coke’s distinction between “conquest” and “descent,” Mansfield is elsewhere less 
mannerly in his contempt for “that strange extrajudicial opinion, as to a conquest from a pagan 
country […] which as to this purpose is wholly groundless, and most deservedly exploded.”62  
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 That Mansfield should have offered in the process some new dicta of his own, advice more 
befitting the wars of the latter eighteenth century, should not be surprising either, nor indeed 
should it surprise that it would be these dicta which gave Campbell v Hall (1774) its weighty 
importance in the imperial constitution. Among other things, Mansfield went out of his way to 
clarify the relationship between crown, parliament, and colonial legislatures. According to 
Mansfield, the king’s power to create laws by his prerogative alone for Grenada was 
disqualified by his earlier endorsement of the installation of a legislative assembly for the 
island. Thereupon, only such laws as were passed by the imperial parliament, and those passed 
subordinately “by the assembly with the governor and council,” were valid in conquered 
countries. Over the next few decades, those plantation colonies of the West Indies which 
accrued to Great Britain were governed according to this dictum, but teething problems 
abounded, for merely the acquisition of colonies by conquest or cession imposed no obligation 
upon the crown to grant local legislatures. Many colonies therefore went without legislatures 
for some time, wherever they were regarded, from the viewpoint of London, as unready for 
self-government in the English model.63 Trinidad by dint of its mixed composition and hybrid 
legal system, for example, was administered after 1797 by a despotic crown governor who 
preferred instead to corrupt those customs he inherited from the previous Spanish régimen than 
to receive English laws, and this was no aberration thanks to Campbell v Hall.64 Courtesy of 
Mansfield, conquest in English legal thought, though shorn of its ridiculous intolerance of non-
Christian legal systems, now carried a clear message to colonial subjects that their teleological 
progression towards self-government was something that had to be accomplished and politely 
received. This too would remain a recurring theme in the imperial imagination for the next 150 
years. 
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“AS TO THE TRADING WITH INFIDELS, AND THEIR BEING PERPETUI 
INIMICI, THIS WAS LAUGHED AT BY HIM” 
 
Michelborne was exhumed in 1681. This was done to find a meaningful way to address the 
problems caused by private unlicenced traders abroad, those called “interlopers.” Interlopers 
had been raising all sorts of questions about infringements upon the liberty or privilege of trade 
throughout the 1670s. Multiple authorities in different corners of the world developed 
strategies in response that were often inconsistent in approach and jurisdictionally dissonant. 
Colonial courts and councils, company tribunals, courts of admiralty, vice-admiralty, common 
law, and equity, the Commons, the Lords, and the Councils of Trade and Plantation – each 
reporting to the Privy Council, which in its turn, referred questions to the revolving doors of 
the king’s lawyers – were all confounded by interlopers and the odium of monopoly.  
 
Making matters more complicated, infidels were thrown into this mix. Referred an enquiry 
about the East Indies trade by the Privy Council in November of 1681, the attorney general, 
Robert Sawyer, recalled Coke’s recommendation in Michelborne that trading with infidels was 
impossible without the king’s license. As Sawyer would advise the king, “by law, your 
Majesty’s subjects ought not to trade or traffic with any infidel country not in amity with your 
Majesty, without your licence.” Sawyer therefore recommended a royal proclamation be issued 
to “require your subjects’ obedience” to this assertion, and to remind potential interlopers that 
the company’s license to prohibit others from India was “good in law.”65 The same day, Charles 
II issued a proclamation to this effect, forbidding all private trade with “infidels or barbarous 
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 nations,” and restating the exclusive trading region of the East India Company.66 This was not 
positive law, but an expression of how the king and council thought law should bind, and as 
such, it did not sit around for long before facing a test in the courts. 
 
Late in 1682, king and council received inside word that Thomas Sandys, unaffiliated with the 
East India Company, was outfitting a ship bound for the Indian Ocean. On 13 December, the 
king’s advocate general in the Court of Admiralty, Sir Thomas Exton, was directed to issue an 
order “that the said ship shall not go nor trade with any infidel country within the limits of the 
East-India Company’s charter without His Majesty’s licence.”67 The wording here is curious 
for its conflation of reasons for restricting the trade within this particular region: owing to its 
irreligion (“shall not go nor trade with any infidel country”), and also its delimitation within 
letters patent (“within the limits of the East-India Company’s charter”). It is telling for us that 
the infidel portion of this equation for staying the ship on the Thames appears absent from the 
presentations before the Court of Chancery, where the issue headed next. Here, where common 
law dicta and ratio need not apply, representatives for the company hoped for a swift first-
instance honouring of the charter. In January, the Lord Keeper Francis North cared not for any 
argument about infidels, assessing only the validity of the seizure on the basis of the patent, 
and “the Antiquity of their Possession, which had not been till now of late Interrupted by these 
Interlopers.”68 Sandys, for his part, declared simply that the patent was a monopoly and 
therefore void. Although North thought that the patent had been issued for the regulation of 
trade rather than for its monopolisation, he refused to be drawn into an assessment of its 
validity, which was better the job, he insisted, for the common law.69  
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Submissions and appeals were brought into the inferior courts in the middle of 1683, requiring 
arguments to be rehearsed intermittently before the King’s Bench up to the beginning of 1685. 
Space does not permit any excursion here into the many fascinating aspects of this case, which 
circled around the prerogative writ of ne exeat regnum (restricting departure from the realm), 
the authority of letters patent in regards to the awarding of exclusive trading privileges, the 
extent to which the corporation could be considered a monopoly, and the extent to which the 
company’s activities ran afoul of statutes from the time of Edward III (1327-77) opening the 
seas to all merchants and prohibited stockpiling.70 Besides all of that, East India Company v 
Thomas Sandys (1683-5) necessitated a conversation about the power of the crown to permit 
or prohibit trading with infidels. “I do conceive that by the law of the land,” counsel for the 
company, the up-and-coming John Holt offered, citing Michelborne, “that no subject of 
England can trade with infidels, without licence from the king; or at least it is in the power of 
the king to prohibit it.” This Holt followed up with a reminder that infidels were the perpetual 
enemies of England. Off Holt then set on a zealous imploration of the “preservation of 
Christianity,” before rounding off with a recitation of Coke on the cessation of all laws upon 
the conquest of infidels.71 In response, George Treby, the recorder for London, took aim, first, 
at Coke’s remarks upon infidels in Michelborne: “a casual saying,” based on “slender 
authority,” and 
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 reported as dictum obiter […] which the clerk took, and likely mistook, for it is no 
where said in my lord Coke’s own books, though they are voluminous […] Neither Mr. 
Holt nor I can find [the licence from Edward III], nor does my lord Coke tell us where 
it was.72 
 
But this hardly mattered: “If the law had been according to this conceit, there would have been 
much said and done about it in divers cases.”73 So much, then, for Michelborne. Moving onto 
Calvin’s Case, Treby was more categorically dismissive. “As to this singular opinion of 
infidels being perpetual enemies, it is not easy to understand what my lord Coke means by it”:  
 
It seems by these words, that it is to be understood of a spiritual discord in respect of 
religion, and not a temporal between the nations: for he says, it is because they are the 
Devil’s subjects, and he relies upon the texts of scripture: and if this perpetual hostility 
be taken in a political and proper sense, and the law be so, it destroys the licence and 
privilege of the Company, and their action brought, and all possibility of such a thing 
for them. There is not nor can be any peace, treaty or intercourse between the English 
and the Indians, but a constant never-ceasing state of war; and especially if it lie 
founded upon a Divine precept: for whatsoever prerogative the king may have, he 
cannot have a prerogative to dispense with the canon of the scripture. 
 
Treby, tempted here to argue that prohibitions from trading with infidels applied as much to 
the company as it did Sandys, ultimately dismissed the whole “notion” to be “a conceit absurd, 
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 monkish, fantastical and fanatical.”74 Trade ought to be free between consenting peoples 
regardless of their predispositions of faith.75 
 
Before the King’s Bench in the summer of 1684, the solicitor general, Heneage Finch, opened 
proceedings with a reminder of Michelborne before then recounting Holt’s case.76 The most 
original interpretation in Finch’s presentation concerned the ordering of the empire, one that 
was probably conceived, it might be guessed, with all of those references from the Privy 
Council about the Caribbean fresh in his mind. Chartered trading corporations, Finch declared,  
 
are in the nature almost of foreign plantations, under a regulated and Christian 
government within themselves, whereby those mischiefs are prevented, that would 
have fallen upon an unlimited and unregulated trade with infidels, that are enemies to 
our religion and nation; which the law […] takes so much care to prevent.77  
 
That the politics of Caribbean legislatures could be seen in the same light as trading companies 
purely to reaffirm the suggestion in Michelborne that trade with non-Christians was prohibited 
gives a remarkable indication of how functionally synthetic – but still unthought through – the 
imperial constitutional imagination had become within officialdom by the end of the Stuart 
period. 
 
Responding to this for Sandys was Henry Pollexfen, who was adamant that this case concerned 
neither the king’s power to organise trade, nor his power to prevent subjects from leaving the 
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 kingdom, but was rather just about monopoly and the means by which the joint-stock 
corporation had acquired it.78 Unlike the regulated trading companies for the Levant and 
Russia, which allowed merchants to trade with their own stocks in distributive collaboration 
with the corporation, the East India Company operated on a closed model with a sole stock, 
which restricted all trade to direct employees of the corporation. “[W]e must be as silly as the 
infidels they deal with in these matters not to distinguish betwixt these corporations,” Pollexfen 
joked, before then vilifying the corporation for being organized around a joint stock.79 What 
made this case all the more absurd to Pollexfen, perhaps more than anyone else, was the 
irrelevance of religion to any contemplation of the trading privileges found in the possession 
of a fictitious corporate personality.80 He then concluded with a parting stab at Coke’s remarks 
about infidels in Calvin’s Case in relation to the customary reception of Jews, “Turks,” and 
“Barbars,” with whom no contract could be possible if they truly were perpetual enemies in 
the common law.81 Nothing of this was sufficient to influence the decision of Chief Justice 
George Jeffreys, however, who ruled unequivocally for the prerogatives of the crown, and, by 
extension, the chartered corporation. This unusual adjudication advised Sandys to consider 
himself lucky to have been stopped from attracting penal punishment, for as Jeffreys warned 
with much ambiguity, should Sandys had gone out to trade with infidels in the Indies, then the 
consequences would have been far worse.82  
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One final controversy regarding monopoly and letters patent came into King’s Bench before 
the disappearance of James II, though it is often overlooked. Early in 1687, Pollexfen appeared 
for an interloper against the Company of Merchant Adventurers. Holt, one of the king’s newest 
serjeants, appeared for the corporation with Finch, fresh from his dismissal the year earlier 
from his position as solicitor general for his refusal to support a Catholic appointment to the 
mastership of an Oxford college.83 The “very ancient company” of London at the centre of the 
dispute had enjoyed privileged control of the cloth export trade to the Low Countries for over 
two centuries. On the basis of its Elizabethan letters patent, the corporation brought a special 
action against a trader by the name of Rebow, who “did trade into those parts without their 
authority, and imported goods from thence.”84 Fresh on the heels of Sandys, the case against 
Rebow was polished. Pollexfen, in response to the counsel for the company, was clever to insist 
that this case was different from Sandys for the critical reason that nobody considered western 
Europe to be an infidel territory.85 This forced the litigants into deeper reflection upon the 
king’s prerogative to regulate trade; or, more specifically, how this prerogative measured up, 
firstly, to fourteenth-century statutes of the realm opening the seas to all merchants, and 
secondly, to the prohibitive tenor of the common law towards patents of monopoly. Finch now 
found the tide running against him. With the suit irreparably discredited, because no infidels 
were involved, he made the desperate objection at this stage that the company’s patents were 
good because “we trade with separate stocks,” rather than “a joint-stock.”86 The case fell apart 
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 and no judgement was entered, with the report left only to suggest ambiguously that prerogative 
grants touching staple trades were void without parliamentary authorisation.87  
 
This turned out to be the first of many common law rulings which slowly, if unevenly, peeled 
back some of the privileges granted by prerogative to chartered trading companies.88 The most 
important intervention in this respect curtailed the ability of the Royal African Company and 
the East India Company to seize vessels suspected of interloping, and once again, Holt as Chief 
Justice leaves his mark upon the law. The case concerned Jeffrey Nightingale, an interloping 
slave trader, who sought to recover his ship, the James, which had been seized by the Royal 
African Company’s vice-admiralty court. Upon an action of trover (for the recovery of 
damages for the conversion of personal property) in the King’s Bench, a special verdict was 
delivered on the validity of the charter, which necessarily entailed the measuring of the 
company’s delegated authority of vice-admiralty against the common law’s protections against 
the seizure of property. The case gets uneven coverage in the reports, with Sir Bartholomew 
Shower’s account of his own showing in defence of Nightingale the most elaborate and, for 
our purposes, revealing. Anticipating an argument “that infidels are alien enemies, and to trade 
with them is unlawful, and therefore a seizure lawful,” Shower is reported to have offered the 
following appraisal:  
 
I find [no] pretence for such an opinion in the books; there is nothing but Michelburn’s 
case, and that is but a short and imperfect note of a case, and all that it amounts to is 
this: that the King may restrain his subjects from commerce with them, which argues 
nothing to this purpose here in our case, and it is plain that commerce is allowable with 
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 the Jews, which according to the gospel are greater enemies to Christianity than the 
Gentiles are. That it was not unlawful antecedent to their charter, appears from the 
statutes, for they open the seas to all merchants for all manner of trade, as 18 Edw. 3, 
st. 2, c. 3, “that the seas are open to all manner of merchants to pass with their 
merchandizes where it shall please them”. Besides, the charter prohibits trade there, not 
because it is inhabited by infidels, but doth indefinitely forbid all but the company, 
whether the country shall be Christian or Pagan. Secondly, it is no argument that they 
were infidels, and trade with them might be prohibited, that therefore the goods should 
be forfeited; […] I will suppose their principle true, that they are perpetui inimici, and 
then according to that notion a trade with them is treason, as an abetting of the King’s 
enemies; and yet even in that case there ought to be no seizure of the offender’s goods 
till conviction, or at least indictment or inquisition: but further, I will suppose their 
charter makes it unlawful, yet it cannot impose the penalty of confiscation of goods, for 
by Magna Charta no man is to be dispossessed of his property but by legale judicium 
parium suorum. 
 
A wonderful example of the chaotic method typical of common law arguments of the period, 
all this manoeuvring between different interpretations of custom, statute, case law, letters 
patent, and the Magna Carta might instead be seen as just the kind of thing good counsel had 
to do to win cases. Holt indeed was swayed, awarding damages and costs to Nightingale.89  
 
This beckoned the return of Thomas Sandys to the courts in 1692 to make good his earlier 
losses. Procedurally and jurisdictionally, his task was made somewhat harder by having to 
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 prove a tort for which the company should be responsible (for in his case it had been the king 
who ordered Admiralty to seize his ship). Here is not the place for a detailed account of the 
complexities involved in this fascinating interchange which, despite the company’s attempts to 
evade the charge by hiding behind a corporate personality, ultimately confirmed on appeal that 
Sandys should expect damages.90 It is sufficient here merely to note how, in arguing for the 
company in the first stages, Sir Creswell Levinz is said to have “laughed at” any notion that 
trading with infidels was prohibited because they were perpetual enemies. With this gesture, 
“the Court seemed to agree […] for how shall they be converted, if conversation with them is 
not lawful?”91 
 
“SO ODIOUS, THAT NOTHING CAN BE SUFFERED TO SUPPORT IT, BUT 
POSITIVE LAW”  
 
If the recognition of property within persons was impossible within England, this did not 
necessarily mean that slavery was therefore impracticable in the English Atlantic. Rather all it 
ensured was that no suits could be heard at common law anywhere that required an assessment 
of the value of human chattel. This was about to change, however, and the rehashing of Coke’s 
remarks upon infidels and villeinage allowed for this. Thus came about the oddest cameo for 
infidels in English courts in the century following 1670: made to perform in such a way as to 
make chattel slavery compatible with the common law.92 
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 Butts v Penny (1676) introduced faithlessness definitively into the jurisprudence of slavery. 
Before the Court of King’s Bench, it was alleged by trover that “negroes were infidels, and the 
subjects of an infidel prince,” and for that reason purchasable and sellable “by the custom of 
merchants.” Mainstream reports of the case are spare and highly compressed, but it appears 
that the Institutes were used to facilitate an enquiry into the suitability of the analogy of 
villeinage, despite the very little by way of support offered by Coke (or Littleton, for that 
matter) on chattel slavery. In the course of subsequent argument, it then appears to have been 
implied that baptism was sufficient to enfranchise slaves, but until such point “there might be 
a property in [negroes] sufficient to maintain trover.”93  
 
The implication that baptism might modify the personality of a formerly faithless slave was 
queried in dicta and ratio of subsequent case law often hinging on the technicalities of common 
law pleading.94 The first case of importance would be Sir Thomas Grantham’s Case (1686). 
Having come into the possession of a “monster” from “the Indies,” Grantham wished to make 
a spectacle in England of his rare disfigurement. Upon returning to England in 1685, however, 
the slave was baptised and detained, compelling Grantham to bring a writ of replevin in order 
to restore his property. His action appears to have been successful notwithstanding doubts 
about the type of property actually restorable.95 Trover emerged again in Gelly v Cleve (1694). 
There it was held, before the Court of Common Pleas, “that trover will lie for a negro boy; for 
they are heathens, and therefore a man may have property in them.”96 Trespass was 
subsequently allowed for “qualified property” in slaves in Chamberline v Harvey (1696), 
following the baptism and removal to England of a slave originally in the possession of 
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 Chamberline without his consent. Elaborate arguments were made on either side of the 
proposition that baptism brought about the manumission of a slave. In the end, however, this 
was inconsequential to the more important contention of the case, namely, as to the kind of 
damages awardable to slaveowners (ultimately circumscribed here to account only for the loss 
of service instead of value or damages).97 One final case of importance in this window was 
Smith v Gould (1705), which cast fresh doubts upon the action of trover for slave property. 
Turning over Butts v Penny, and finally dismissing the notion that infidels were property by 
default, Chief Justice John Holt recommended that the superior action to bring was a suit in 
trespass upon the servitude of a captive, the ownership over whom was ambivalently 
conceded.98  
 
The real scare, first exposed in Chamberline v Harvey (but impossible without the support of 
the Institutes and Calvin’s Case), that slaves converting to Christianity might hasten their 
evasion of the completest condition of chattel, carried over into the early eighteenth century. 
In the slaveholding American colonies, a consensus began to emerge, from a slew of statutes, 
that a slave who converted after enslavement would not attain freedom, but a slave originally 
Christian in his or her country of birth might enjoy the case for conditional leave from 
bondage.99 However bold it was to measure straight-talking colonial legislation against the 
abbreviated judgments of English law reports, the result of these acts was a drop in opposition 
among slaveholders to converting their slaves to Christianity. Reservations about slave baptism 
remained among a few slaveholders, particularly those in Jamaica, until the crown law officers 
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 were advised to weigh in on the question in 1729.100 In that year, the attorney general, Philip 
Yorke, and solicitor general, Charles Talbot, offered their opinion that a slave was not made 
free just by reaching Great Britain, “nor doth baptism bestow freedom on him, or make any 
alteration in his temporal condition, in these kingdoms.”101 Ostensibly, the opinion was offered 
to encourage slaveholders to christen their slaves and also to deter escapees from attempting to 
reach the British Isles, but stood, for two decades, without much by way of support before the 
judgment of the Court of Chancery in Pearne v Lisle (1749). Yorke, now as Lord Chancellor, 
here confirmed his opinion of 1729 while in the process discrediting Smith v Gould (1705):  
 
I have no doubt but trover will lie for a Negro slave; it is as much property as any other 
thing […] There was once a doubt, whether, if they were christened, they would not 
become free by that act […] till the opinion of Lord Talbot and myself, then Attorney 
and Solicitor-General, was taken on that point. We were both of opinion, that it did not 
at all alter their state.102  
 
Only in equity could the presiding Lord Chancellor cite his own benediction as attorney general 
in order to disqualify precedents at common law. But statute was now on his side: seeing 
negroes as property was encouraged by imperial legislation of 1732.103  
 
The combined effect of this statute, the colonial statutes, and Pearne v Lisle was to remove the 
question of infidel status from the equation of property rights in slaves for the next few decades, 
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 however repugnantly this was beginning to run against the feelings of metropolitan opponents 
to slavery. Legal scholar William Blackstone pulled no punches in his treatment of “the 
infamous and unchristian practice of withholding baptism from negro servants, lest they should 
thereby gain their liberty,” in his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-7):  
 
The law of England acts upon general and extensive principles: it gives liberty, rightly 
understood, that is, protection, to a Jew, a Turk, or a heathen, as well as to those who 
profess the true religion of Christ; and it will not dissolve a civil obligation between 
master and servant, on account of the alteration of faith in either of the parties: but the 
slave is entitled to the same protection it.104 
 
This was stirring, but not, strictly speaking, jurisprudence. The definitive chance for that would 
have to wait until Somerset v Stewart (1772).105 This case concerned the detention of James 
Somerset, an African slave, in England, in preparation for his voyage in bondage to Jamaica. 
Ordering Somerset to be discharged and given freedom, Lord Mansfield in the Court of King’s 
Bench declared slavery to be “so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive 
law.”106 With that, Mansfield threw away the old common law of slavery and created a new 
common law of slavery, one that anticipated, but could not yet respond to, the momentous 
discord that was about to break out between central abolitionism and peripheral pro-slavery. 
Faithlessness played no part in the legalism of this distinction as it then developed in the British 
Empire: following Somerset, through to the statutory abolition of the slave trade in 1807, and 
finally with the substitution of slavery with apprenticeships in 1833, parliament and the 
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 common law strode with their heads together, whig alongside wig, to eradicate slavery.107 In 
the southern slaveholding states of America, by contrast, lawyers tried their hardest to forget 
Somerset in order to develop their own common law of slavery for the nineteenth century.108 
 
“THE COMMON LAW WORKS ITSELF PURE”  
 
This article has shown how, piecemeal, after Nightingale, judges in the English courts of 
common law aggressively queried many of the incapacities associated with the legal 
personality of infidels. Certainly the most stubborn of these incapacities to carry into the 
eighteenth century was the inability of infidels to give evidence in court. It is ironic that some 
of the earliest moves away from Broke and Coke on this head concerned only Christians. In 
Wells v Williams (1697), for example, the plaintiff was a French Protestant who brought a suit 
for the recovery of debts. His action was queried owing to his status as an “alien enemy,” it 
was alleged for Williams, amid the Nine Years War. “But now,” counsel for Wells retorted, 
“commerce has taught the world more humanity.”  
 
It was beginning to teach the world political economy, as well. At the end of so many years of 
making new enemies on the continent, it was never so evident to common lawyers that it was 
now necessary to retain peaceful foreign merchants “sub protectione” in England, and to 
provide them with the fullest capacity to maintain actions at law. Finding for the French 
plaintiff, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas also took the opportunity to affix to the 
judgment a repudiation not only of Coke’s dictum about perpetui inimici but also Broke’s 
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 dictum about pagans in the Year Books of Henry VIII.109 The Chief Justice in question was 
George Treby, who as counsel for Thomas Sandys had been the first to take issue with Coke’s 
pronouncements on infidels thirteen years earlier, however losing as he did on that occasion. 
Treby could now try to set things right, if only with his own dicta. As such, that left it up to 
later judges to determine if they could be used to overturn preceding dicta and custom touching 
the inability of non-Christians to bring actions and give evidence in court. Herein we see a 
recurring trend in the early modern common law, a trend which, this article has argued, can 
best be understood by historians of ideas sensitive to the contingencies of personae, politics, 
and pragmatism, all of which together shaped the laws of England and its empire. The 
replacement of old dicta with new dicta amounts to more than just a thing of jurisprudence; it 
reveals the history of political and economic ideas at work. 
 
Few examples illustrate this phenomenon better than Omychund v Barker (1744), which 
allowed Hindus to swear oaths, and present depositions, in pursuit of debts from the East India 
Company. Great Britain, at this stage, was strategically embedded into an alliance against 
France, amid a global fight over monarchy and religion that was soon to reach the shores of 
the Carnatic. All the while, the first intellectual strides were being made towards embracing 
“commercial society” and abandoning all “jealousy of trade.’110 It was in this context that the 
law officers of the crown were appointed counsel to “witnesses of the Gentoo religion” before 
Chancery late in 1744. “It is of the greatest moment,” argued the attorney general, Dudley 
Rider, “that we should have commerce and correspondence with all mankind; trade requires it, 
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 policy requires it, and in dealings of this kind it is of infinite consequence, there should not be 
a failure of justice.” These sentiments were then advanced, in the framework of an argument 
for a reforming common law tradition, by the capable solicitor general, William Murray 
(twelve years before swearing into the King’s Bench as Lord Mansfield). For the young 
Mansfield, Coke’s remarks from the Institutes were “not warranted by any authority, nor 
supported by any reason, and lastly contradicted by common experience.” Recognising, 
further, that the age of discovery had given way to the age of global commerce, Mansfield 
argued that the statutory requirement for providing oaths had fallen out of step with the times, 
warning that Chancery, if careless, may commit the same error: 
 
All occasions do not arise at once; now a particular species of Indians appears; hereafter 
another species of Indians may arise; a statute very seldom can take in all cases, 
therefore the common law, that works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of 
justice, is for this reason superior to an act of parliament.111 
 
Expressions like this were to become emblematic of a common law tradition that could look 
just as comfortable tearing strips off its competing institutions as it could in Coke’s time. That 
Edmund Burke, during the impeachment of Warren Hastings before the Lords, would “use 
Lord Mansfield’s expression” about the common law and the fountain of justice, while making 
the case for “conforming our Jurisprudence to the Growth of our Commerce and of our 
Empire,” suggests something of the circumstantial importance of the expression.112  
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 Mansfield’s quickly iconic description of the common law working itself pure is all the more 
interesting because of its utterance before the Lord Chancellor in a court of equity. There, not 
only was his opinion shared, but the idea would be pushed even further by his senior colleague, 
John Willes, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. Willes argued more persuasively than 
Mansfield that the common law had to purge its impurities in order to make Christian toleration 
compatible with undiscriminatingly free trade. Not only bad statutes, but bad dicta, too, had to 
be discarded in the process. Obstructing infidels from maintaining an action in English courts 
was “contrary not only to the scripture but to common sense and common humanity […]; and 
besides the irreligion of it, it is a most impolitic notion and would at once destroy all that trade 
and commerce from which this nation reaps such great benefits.”113 Now in a new Christian 
spirit of commerce, Hindu men were allowed to present depositions in the courts. Tradition 
could not entirely be abandoned in the process, however: it was clarified that Hindu testimony 
was permissible only because Hindus believed in their own deity.114 
 
Part of the magic of the English common law, from the old Year Books through to the present, 
is the motivation it gives to its practitioners to engage with old contexts for the purpose of 
evaluating the reiteration of dicta and ratio in changing political and economic circumstances. 
In one sense, the common lawyers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries worked more as 
intellectual historians than their continental colleagues did, if only by the antiquity of the 
actions, the formality of the pleadings, and the encouragement they received to recall 
precedents in context. In another sense, however much they hoped to avoid reliving the 
mistakes of their ancestors, the deliberate and self-preservationist insularity of their profession 
instilled in its practitioners a need to keep a little distance from debates in the Commons, 
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 coffeehouse gossip, and the writings of men like Bacon, Hobbes, Child, Locke, Hume, Smith, 
and Burke. Sometimes, undoubtedly, counsel and judges translated many of these externalities 
into the bespoke vocabulary of the common law. But at other times, they were clearly ahead of 
the curve, anticipating rather than responding to broader political changes.  
 
Following infidels through this common law world reveals, firstly, a willingness to adapt old 
rules for new circumstances coupled, secondly, with a fear of moving too far from the 
precedents of old case law. Now, both of these characteristics are still attributable to common 
lawyers today, well after the globalisation of their enterprise (a development, it needs only be 
added, that might not have occurred if its strong intolerance towards non-Christians had not 
been expunged). 
